Tag Archives: Juan Manuel Santos Calderón

Colombia-FARC Land Reform; in whose interests?

The third and final part of a series I did critically analyzing the Agrarian Reform agreement that came out of the peace talks in Havana between the FARC-EP and the government of Colombia. This was originally published on Saturday, June 1st over at Colombia Politics. 

I also thought it was important to add on a bit about the Zonas de Reserva Campesina/the Autonomous Peasant Zones, to contrast the deal between the government and the rebels with a peasant perspective.

Colombia FARC land reform; in whose interests?

farm

Colombia´s government and the rebel guerrilla group the FARC last week signed an historic agreement on land reform as part of the peace processs currently underway in Havana, Cuba. Over the last few days I have looked at the detail of this agreement and analysed the historical context of previous violent and failed attempts at land reform in Colombia. This third article looks at the possible interests at work behind this reform.

So whose interests does this reform serve?

Supporters are correct, this reform would never be able to pass in Colombia’s extremely conservative, oligarchic, co-opted, and paramilitarized democracy.

For some, this negotiation represents an opportunity for a social transformation that is as necessary as it is impossible in Colombia’s political system.

Of course the ultimate goal of the talks in Havana is a demobilization of the guerrilla force, but the FARC did not appear out of thin air, and they are the (some would say misguided/arrogant) product of centuries of marginalization of the peasantry.

So will the Agrarian Reform not only reform land, but the power relationships which keep the Colombian peasantry in a state of displacement and exploitation?

Economic Interests

Firstly, the deal says that land will not be taken from those who have acquired their land “legitimately”. But…

Much of the violently expropriated land has the paperwork to prove its legality; the former AUC paramilitary leader Vicente Castaño´s African Palm Oil cultivations, for example.

And the logic of this reform is contradictory. It assumes the “legal” concentration of land (which even before paramilitarism, and even La Violencia, was soaked in violence) is some how ethical or tolerable.

The government will not go after land owners who have gained their wealth “honestly”, but this surely goes against the philosophy of the President’s landmark Victim’s Law which has a reverse onus of proof (the land owner has to prove that the land was acquired through legal means).

Agrarian Reform for me will also have very little impact when we consider the rise of Free Trade Agreements, which appear to be the new economic threat to the Colombian peasantry.  Colombian exports to the US have already decreased, but Colombian imports from the US have increased.

How is the Colombian peasant supposed to compete against heavily subsidized Canadian, American, and European agricultural goods?

How is the Colombian peasant supposed to protect their land from Canadian, American, and British mining corporations?

The answer is that he is “encouraged” to become a part of agribusiness.

The Agrarian Reform promotes a more “productive” countryside and  food security” but it says nothing of food sovereignty which the Colombian peasant movement has been struggling for.

For whom is the countryside supposed to be more “productive”? Who will gain – rural Colombians, the majority of whom live in poverty, or European, American, and Canadian consumers of coffee, roses, bananas, and palm oil?

One of Colombia´s leading political publications La Silla Vacia argues:

“Agribusiness will win because – if one day these accords are implemented – there will finally be a real land market in Colombia, something vital for global competitiveness”.

A reform for the few not the many, but why?

So if the reform instead of being transformative is in fact for the benefit of the business class why was this?

I believe it is a question of democracy, representation and power.

First – the only people who get heard are those at the table.

The FARC leadership is represented by Ivan Marquez, Pablo Catatumbo, and Andres Paris, among others, while the government has brought together the Bogota elite, with former Vice-President, Supreme Court Magistrate, and architect of the 1991 constitution Humberto De La Calle; Sergio Jaramillo, who was Santos’ right-hand man as Defence Minister and is seen as one of the chief planners behind Uribe’s “Democratic Security” counter-terrorism strategy; Oscar Naranjo and Jorge Mora, representing the Police and the Army, respectively; and of course, Luis Carlos Villegas, President of the National Association of Entrepreneurs, who’s daughter had once been kidnapped by the FARC.

So, who is not at the table?

Afro-Colombians, indigenous people, displaced people, people representing victims´ groups, the peasantry, working people, women, refugees, youth/former forced combatants, and most importantly  people representing the communities which still live under the occupation of the FARC guerrillas. In short anyone that either doesn’t represent the Colombian political and economic establishment, the State institutions of violence, or armed rebels.

Santos and the FARC really don’t have any broad support.

Meanwhile the true holders of power when it comes to the land issue is the landed elite represented by the association of cattle-ranchers, FEDEGAN, and their President Jose Felix LaFaurie, and, of course Alvaro Uribe. But Uribe, LaFaurie, and the uribista land-owning class have vehemently opposed the talks, let alone influence the decisions made at the table.

So at the peace table, no one really has any legitimate mandate to say anything on behalf of “Colombians”.

Sure, civil society has been “consulted” within the peace process, having the opportunity to send in proposals to the negotiators online, through forums in the capital, or regional initiatives for peace, but is this anything more than just tokenism?

There is talk of the FARC wanting to create a Popular Assembly to ratify any Peace Agreement, while the government says it is committed to holding a referendum, but even this does not give the Colombian people a proper voice. The choice will be a false one. Either support an imposed peace or we´re going back to war.

Colombian peasants however, understand the deep contradictions within the process and are actively struggling to change it.

The agreement seeks to “invigorate” the Zonas de Reserva Campesina, “Peasant Reserve Zones”, areas which peasant lands were to be protected from activities detrimental to the small-scale land economy such as mono-cultives, mining, and the concentration of land. So far there are only 6 in the country, and the Minister of Agriculture Luis Camilo Restrepo has criticized them as “little independent republics”. Under Uribe, they were stigmatized as “zones of subversion”.

The Association representing the zones and 50 peasant organizations across the country, ANZORC, held a national conference with thousands of peasants in San Vicente del Caguan (site of the failed 1998-2002 negotiatons with the FARC), in which they elaborated their visions for their own future concerning mining and energy policy, coca eradication and crop substitution, the financing of their economic plans, and their relationship to international development organizations. They invited government representatives to their policy conference, and tried to connect with Havana through the internet, hoping to be heard at the negotiating table. The FARC were present as unfortunately, these zones are in areas that have traditionally been under guerrilla control. They are also asking for political and cultural recognition of their communities, autonomy so they can manage them, and for a consideration of alternative forms of economic development. ANZORC has also emphasized that they do not want hand-outs/”assistencialism”, but instead they want the power to make decisions over their own development.

An historic agreement after all?

The Agrarian Reform agreement may indeed be historic. It is a positive sign that this time around the FARC are serious about a negotiated settlement.

The true root causes of the conflict – the relationship between the different classes of Colombia to land, and of that tension to armed violence – however, has only been partially addressed.

The voices of those most affected haven’t really been heard at the table.

The government and an echo chamber of journalists, pundits, politicians, and others are claiming that this will be a sustainable solution to the issue at the root of social and political conflict in Colombia.Yet it seems that this agreement is far from transformative – it does not subvert how power works in Colombia, but instead reinforces it.

The government, through the negotiations in Havana, represents those Colombians who apparently are the only ones who have ever mattered in its eyes – those with land or guns.

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FARC agreement: Colombia´s history of violence and failed agrarian reform

This is part two of three looking at last week’s so-called “historic” Agrarian Reform agreement between the FARC-EP and the Colombian  government as part of Peace talks in Havana. Here, I take a look at Colombia’s history of failed agrarian reforms. This was originally published on May 30, 2013 over at Colombia Politics.  If you want to know more, I strongly recommend that you check out this an analysis of land concentration in Colombia by Ana Maria Ibanez and Juan Carlos Munoz from the University of the Andes.

FARC agreement: Colombia´s history of violence and failed agrarian reform

Soldados de la Fuerza Tarea Omega patrullan y revisan hoy 6 de agosto del 2009 en las selvas de Vista Hermosa  Meta , uno de los campamentos del frente 27 de las FARC, en medio de la ofensiva del Ejercito Nacional por la captura del Mono Jojoy, miembro del secretariado de las FARC. FOTO MAURICIO MORENO EL TIEMPO

Colombia´s government has signed an agreement with FARC guerrillas for agrarian or rural reform as part of the peace process currently underway in Havana.

On Tuesday I looked at the detail behind this accord, today I turn to history for the lessons we can learn from failed attempts at land reform in Colombia.

Colombia´s land; in the hands of the few, not the many

Like in many other Latin American countries, or post-colonial oligarchies/plutocracies, the wealth that comes from the land has been violently concentrated through different processes (genocide of indigenous peoples, colonialism, the encomienda system, agrarian reforms gone awry, free trade agreements/neoliberalism, and of course armed counter-agrarian reform/socio-political violence) for the last 500 years or so.

For historical reasons and due to the armed violence, however, Colombian rural inequality is particularly stark. 

An astounding 52% of the land is owned by 1.15% of the population. The rural GINI coefficient (the standard measure for inequality among economists) is 0.85 (where a 1 means complete inequality/where one person owns everything). Only a fifth of the potentially productive land is actually being put to use.

Colombia is by no means a naturally unequal place. So, how did we get to to this point?

I don’t want to give a history lesson, but I think Sunday’s agreement between the FARC and the Santos Government is not just a deal within it itself, but represents a significant shift in a process of popular (often armed) mobilization for agrarian reform, and counter-mobilization and concentration by the elite.

This process refers not only to Colombia´s current violence (the 49 year long war and humanitarian disaster) but also a defining aspect of the entire way the nation has been organized since the encomienda.

The history of land concentration

Initially, land was organized around the idea of owning the land that one worked (or had workers on). Later, Spanish colonial government allowed private buyers to purchase government estates, and in 1821, the government allowed the direct transfer of public land into private hands.

Under the colonial regime, land belonging to the Church or to indigenous communities was nominally protected from colonization. However, these rights were abolished for indigenous reserves in 1810, and for the Church later on.

The legalization/formalization of uncultivated public land (baldios) was handled by a government who was (much like today’s Colombia) run exclusively by the elite, leading to the creation of even more large estates for the wealthy.

Land, as a way of avoiding taxes, fighting inflation, and building credit, made it an asset which was more valuable than just what it was able to produce, making it (like in most places) one of the most coveted assets by the elites, leaving little for the landless/popular classes.

The colonization of the Colombian territory saw small-scale peasant farmers pushed off their land, forced to move into more marginal areas which they would then make productive. The landed elites would then (often forcibly) push them off of this land, and in the process expanding their territory and further consolidating its ownership.

The peasants, now landless, would move deeper into the jungle/territory/mountains looking for land. This process to a certain extent still occurs today.

A peasants´ revolt?

By the 1920s, peasants organized themselves and went on the offensive. The elites in turn responded with more displacement. This social conflict resulted in the Agrarian Reform of 1936, which because of faulty implementation (and Colombia being a Plutocracy), resulted in the formalization of property again benefiting the elites.

The Landed Oligarchy, sick of having to deal with subversive peasants, also looked for ways of making the land productive by having more capital than labour, leading to the rise of cattle-ranching.

The class warfare was only exacerbated by La Violencia  the civil war between the two political factions representing different sectors of the elite (the Liberals and the Conservatives). Forced displacement became an extremely common practice, and the standard method for resolving disputes over land given the general absence of the state in many rural or peripheral areas of the national territory.

In response to this crisis, in 1961 President Carlos Lleras Restrepo attempted a land reform through Law 135. Nevertheless, again, formalization and the granting of public land led to more concentration.

Only 1 per cent of the land was expropriated from the elite, and most of what was expropriated was poor or low-quality land. Ironically, as the government was promoting land reform, it was simultaneously giving large land owners the benefit of subsidies and tax incentives to increase production, increasing the value of their land, and making expropriation more difficult.

Rise of the narco-bourgeousie

From the 1970s to 1984, the rise of the “narco-bourgeousie” and their desire for land led to the decomposition of large estates, and the consolidation of medium-sized ones.

But while the armed counter-agrarian reform of the expansion of paramilitarism, as well as the booming cocaine industry which laundered much of its wealth in large estates reversed this trend, it also introduced drug trafficking into the historical trend of violent conflict between peasants and landed oligarchs.

In 1994, President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo tried another land reform with Law 160. Instead of focusing on formalization or expropriating land from the elite and redistributing it to the peasantry, however, it worked on the transfer of property through market mechanisms, where by the government would supposedly subsidize 70% of land bought by peasants from land owners.

However, as is evidenced by the case of the women of the Enchanted Valley, a group of displaced women who tried to purchase some land through this scheme and are now not only menaced by armed groups but also by debt collectors, the deal was only real in the halls of power in Bogota.

Paramilitarism resulted in the violent expropriation of 1.8 million hectares of land, or 2.5 times more land that had been re-distributed through the latest agrarian reform.

How different will the FARC, Santos Government reform be? 

The Agrarian Reform thrashed out in Havana runs the risk of not being very different from previous failures. This is particularly true of  how the process of “formalizing” land title (as the current agreement with the FARC seeks to do) usually is used by rural elites for their favour, and not for landless peasants.

But this reform forms part of a larger peace deal which is suppose to be transformative for Colombian society, and so the stakes are higher.

Have Paramilitaries entered where the state hasn´t bothered to go? 

Sure the “New Colombian Countryside” deal sounds promising, but will it run the same risk as the 2011 Victim’s Law (Law 1488)?

Countless courageous community leaders in places like El Choco and Cordoba have been threatened or murdered by neo-paramilitary groups simply for advocating for their land rights.

In Cordoba, there is even a neo-paramilitary group that has deemed itself the “Anti-Restitution Army“.

This resurgence of armed agrarian counter-reform (or perhaps, a consolidation that already took place during the height of the AUC paramilitaries), shows that when it comes to land in “The Other Colombia”, not much has changed in 100 or even 200 years.

The government´s apparently noble policy of trying to help the most disenfranchised in Colombian society is fine, but both the fact that the State is co-opted by the elite, and that the state has no little to no legitimate presence beyond the military in “The Other Colombia”, means it has neither the mandate, authority, or capacity to carry out these reforms.

The State can’t re-distribute land in places it has never bothered to show up for.

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Towards Peace and A New Colombian Countryside – But by whom and for whom?

The first in a three part series I wrote about the latest agreement on Agrarian Reform in Havana between the FARC and the Colombian government as part of the Peace talks. This was originally published as a contribution to Colombia Politics.

delacalle Chief government negotiator Humberto De La Calle.

Sunday was another historic day in Colombia’s 49-year war, as it marked the first substantive policy agreement reached by the oldest and strongest guerrilla force in the Western hemisphere, the agrarian and Marxist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-The People’s Army (The FARC-EP or FARC) and the national Government.

The agreement, on land reform, was the first point out of five on the agenda of peace talks currently taking place in Havana. The government and the FARC press release said that this reform is leading towards a “new Colombian countryside”. Over the course of three articles I will look in detail at what this means, what we can learn from history and whose interests are at work.

“What we have achieved with this agreement will begin radical, equitable, and democratic changes in the rural and agrarian reality of Colombia.  It´s centred around the people, the small producer, access and distribution of land, the fight against poverty, the stimulation of agricultural production and the rejuvenation of the countryside’s economy” – FARC and Government negotiators.

So what actually was agreed?  The text isn’t public, and nothing is final until all of the points/the entire process has been agreed upon. However, according to the President’s press office, the agreement is centred around four main pillars:

1. Increase use of, and access to land by the creation of a Land Fund which will give land to peasants who either have none or “too little”. Land for the fund will come from land that has been “acquired illegally”, and that the vast majority of people in the countryside “should not fear” their land being touched if it was acquired legitimately.

Santos said that he hopes to create judicial guarantees to defend the land rights of the smallest and most “defenseless” peasants.

In a press conference, the FARC added two additional points here that they would like to see:

1) That land for the fund should not only come from properties which were the site of displacement and violence, but also land that is related to drug money, state properties, and large unproductive estates, with “priority” being given to peasants and women.

2) That social and environmental limits be placed on the production of hydrocarbons, agribusiness products, open-pit mining, biofuels and the creation of hydro energy projects.

2. Create specialized development programs in the regions where they are most needed.

3. Promote social programs and infrastructure in all of “rural” Colombia. By this, the Colombian head of state meant for national plans that would “radically reduce poverty and extreme poverty” such as irrigation, health, education, roads, potable water, housing, and social protections.

4. Increase food security. The government said that this will focus “on the most poor” and making the countryside “more productive”.

The President noted that a comprehensive land reform is necessary in order to prevent further conflicts. In a point that may generate much controversy among the landed elites is that the agreement will seek to “limit the agricultural frontier” (delimitar la frontera agricola).

The agreement also nodded at other points on the agenda, particularly the rights of victims to effective reparation, as it “seeks to reverse the effects of the conflict and to restitute the victims of forced removal and displacement.” For a more substantive breakdown of the sub-points, policies, and mechanisms of the agreement, please check out Dr. Virigina Bouvier’s recent thoughts.

It also bears mentioning that the agreement seeks a mass formalization/legalization of rural property in Colombia, given the immense amount of informal ownership among the peasantry, reaching 49% generally.

Reasons for optimism?

From a purely humanitarian perspective, the  fact that the FARC and the government seem to have agreed on what has historically been one of the most contentious issues between Leftist/armed popular movements in Colombia and the Establishment makes me confident to say that this time around, if everything stays the course, the FARC will probably demobilize.

Concessions from the FARC?

Even though the FARC´s rhetoric is to ask for more than they will get, the insurgents have clearly moderated their demands, a first in decades.

In their 1982 Congress, the increasingly strong FARC-EP passed their “Law 01″ in which they explicitly ask for the abolishment and expropriation (by them) of all large land estates, land used for mining, bananas, wood, by multinationals etc. Until Sunday, a socialist/anti-capitalist agrarian reform has been their main policy position in previous negotiations.

Is peace near?

We should not confuse the government discourse about “peace” with the demobilization of the FARC.  Even without these marxist rebels there are still the neo-paramilitaries, drug cartels, the ELN, to say nothing of the absurdly high levels of violence related to “common” crime.

However, disarming Latin America’s oldest and strongest insurgency would put a significant break on the violence. No matter what one thinks of the talks, the prospect of a Colombia without the FARC is something that would be worth many concessions (and the government seems to agree).

There has been much celebration in the Colombia and abroad, both in the media and among politicians and civil society. Semana, one of the country’s most influential news magazines, called the reform “an agreement which could settle the State’s debt to the countryside” and American Vice-President Joe Biden also lauded Colombia for the seemingly historic agreement.

It must be noted where this protracted negotiation leaves the peace process, as the clock is ticking. The first point on the agenda was was the most substantive, probably the most divisive only after the question of amnesty, and really the heart of not just Colombia’s armed conflict, but of inequality more generally.

This was no accident as the rationale was to get the most difficult point out of the way, and then sail through the other four (political participation, disarmament/’the end of the conflict’, drug trafficking, and reparations for victims),   which were set out in the pre-agreement/terms of negotiations last summer.

Although peace is not built in a day, the talks are already six months old, and the government has repeatedly said that it will get up from the table in November of this year. Many see this as putting the pressure on the insurgents to show some true commitment and adding dynamism to the process, in contrast to the four-year long fiasco of the Caguan negotiations.

Others argue that the deadline is related to the electoral calendar as Presidential elections will occur in 2014, and if they succeed in a timely manner, would allow Santos to use peace with the FARC for his re-election. It bears mentioning that for their part, the FARC have recognized the slow pace of the talks and have requested for more time.

Tomorrow I’ll look at the agreement from a historical perspective.

Simon is the owner of the website The Banana Plutocracy

Photo, El Tiempo

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La Histórica Marcha para la paz – sus intereses, su significado, el precio de la paz, y sus excluidos

Foto: EFE.

Hoy día en las calles de Bogotá millones de cuerpos colombianos se salieron a las calles, diciendo que ya no quieren mas amenazas a la integridad y seguridad de los mismos cuerpos. Estos cuerpos, despues de 49 años de asesinatos, masacres, lesiones, minas antipersonas, despariciones forzadas, reclutamientos forzados, desplazamientos forzados, violaciones, torturas, secuestros, bombas, y amenazas, quieren traer a la realidad el sueño de una Colombia en paz en vez de una en guerra contra los subversivos.

La marcha fue inicialmente organizada por La Marcha Patriotica y Colombianas y Colombianos por la Paz, liderados por la ex-senadora y auto-denominada defensora de derechos humanos, Piedad Córdoba. Esta fue una movilización pacifica en favor del actual proceso de paz entre el gobierno colombiano y la mayor insurgencia en el país, las FARC-EP.

La movilización se esta realizando en el símbolico 9 de avril, el día nacional de memoria y solidaridad con las víctimas, y el anniversario del asesinato del caudillo Libéral, Jorge Eliecer Gaitán Ayalo que desató el periodo de guerra llamado “La Violencia”.

Algunos medios estan hablando de que asistieron diez de miles a la marcha en solo la plaza de bolivar; otros, especialmente en las redes sociales, ponen la cifra de asistentes en mas de un millón solo en la capital.

En un sentido, esta marcha se puede considerar como histórica en que muestra un completo cambio de tono de las movilizaciones. Hace solo 5 años, la marcha ‘histórica’ fue la del Sr Oscar Morales quien a traves de Facebook organizó la campaña de “Un Millón de Voces Contra Las FARC” que movilizó, por la primera vez en años, millones de colombianos en contra de ese grupo armado. Sin embargo, esta marcha fue fuertemente críticada por su parcialidad (tapando los crímenes de los paramilitares y las Fuerzas Armadas) y por validar el discurso guerrerista y anti-guerrillero del establecimiento político y su contrainsurgencia. Vale resaltar que el ex-Presidente Uribe apoyo esta marcha y sus objetivos.

Ahora, se habla de una marcha pacifica en contra de la guerra y por la paz, organizada por unas entidades que son por nada non-controversiales (la ex-senadora y la Marcha Patriotica han sido acusadas de tener vinculos con la insurgencia marxista). Sin embargo, el país en esta ocasión parece unirse en una marcha multidinaria, sin importar las diferencias sociales y políticas de los participantes, en contraste a la marche de hace cinco años que estaba mas explicitamente ligada a intereses políticos particulares.

Aunque fue organizada por estos seres que todavia tienen una posición ambigua y controversial en el imaginario público, la marcha y su gesto para la paz fue bien recibida por muchos sectores del pensamiento corriente – el propio Presidente de la República, Juan Manuel Santos Calderón, invitó a los colombianos a marchar. El Partido de la U tambien ha estado en favor, y el alcalde de Bogotá, Gustavo Petro tambien llamo con mucha pasión a los colombianos a unirse a este gesto de solidaridad con las víctimas. Hasta los medios corrientes también domestraron su apoyo para la marcha.

Mejor dicho, los manifestantes de la MP quienes vinieron de todas las partes del país, muchos de ‘la Otra Colombia’, invitaron a la Colombia urbana y de clase media a temporaneamente olvidar sus divisones sociales y marchar por una paz común. Y la invitación, inesperadamente, fue bien recibida por la sociedad urbana que hace pocos años estaba marchando en pro de la contrainsurgencia.

Yo creo que la reflexión del editor de la Revista Semana mejor describe el momento político que ocurrió hoy:

En este sentido, quizá la principal lección del 9 de abril no es simplemente que el gobierno logró un importante apoyo callejero y popular a su política de negociación, sino que colombianos de orillas muy distintas, incluso enfrentadas, lograron coincidir por un día, en completa calma, en torno a un objetivo común. Pasada la marcha, por supuesto, las diferencias seguirán. Pero hay muy pocos precedentes de una alianza que vaya de lo más granado del establecimiento hasta lo más ‘duro’ de la izquierda a favor de la paz y la solución negociada. Hasta las Farc y el Eln dieron su apoyo a la manifestación.

Sin embargo, la marcha para la paz, irónicamente, pese a su caracter unificador, también resaltó las profundas divisones sociales y políticas que el proceso a agujido. Oponentes a la marcha incluyeron la rara combinación del Polo Demócratico Alternativo (aunque el congresista Ivan Cepeda y Gustavo Petro asistieron), y por supuesto, el ex-Presidente Uribe y su Puro Centro Demócratico. Los izquerdistas, por su parte, no quieren legitimizar una supuesta politicización del proceso usado por el Presidente Santos para su reelección.  Los uribistas, consideran que negociar con el grupo armado es legitimizarlo y que el proceso esta negociando ‘temas de nación’ con un grupo de ‘narcoterroristas’. En particular, el expresidente a traves de su radio-periodico de Twitter trato a la marcha de un ‘irrespeto’ para las víctimas de la insurgencia.

La marcha tiene bastantes apuestas políticas como lo contó La Silla Vacía- primero que todo, legitimizó, parcialmente, a la Marcha Patriotica y a la ex-Senadora. También, aunque Santos no marcho hasta la Plaza de Bolivar (como lo dijo el editor de Semana, ‘no hubo foto del Presidente con la ex-Senadora’), se puede ver facilmente como la Marcha le esta dando al Presidente una gran ayuda en lograr el ‘mandato’ popular para la negociación del cual le reclamaba el ex-Presidente Andrés Pastrana en su crítica del proceso.

Todo en este mundo, y mucho más en Colombia, tiene interéses particulares – la paz de Colombia debe ser para todos los colombianos, multidinaria, como fue la marcha de hoy. La paz no le debe corresponder a ningún partido político ni ningún mandatario, pero como algunos del Polo han señalado, esto no es el caso.

De el mismo sentido, tenemos que interrogar: esta marcha, y esta paz, es de quien y para quien? Los que ahora estan sentados en la mesa en La Habana discutiendo el comienzo del fin del largo y sangriente conflicto social y armado colombiano son generales, representantes del gobierno casi exclusivamente bogotanos, y no una representación amplia de quienes tienen  mayor interés en una desmovilización de las FARC-EP (los residentes de las comunidades bajo su dominio). De otra parte, no son los miles de soldados menores de edad ni víctimas de las FARC-EP que tienen su silla en la mesa, pero Iván Marquéz, el no. 2 de esta organización guerrillera y el líder del Bloque Caribe quien ha sido acusado de varios crímenes de guerra.

Mejor dicho, lo que se esta negociando en La Habana es una paz entre victimarios. Tanto el gobierno como la guerrilla se creen las víctimas, y ningunos (aunque Timochenko si se pronunció sobre esto despues de la restitución de tierras por el gobierno colombiano en el Caguán) se han comprometido a darle la cara a sus víctimas.

Esta falta de reconocimiento de sus crímenes (de ambas partas) en PRO de la paz, es muy diferente al discurso de memoria y exigencia a la verdad y la justicia que caracterizó mucho de los mensajes vistos hoy por las calles de Colombia.

No digo que lo perfecto sea el enemigo de lo bueno, pero se tiene que reconocer que como todo en Colombia, este proceso se ha dado a una centralización y burocratización; quitandole el poder y la palabra a los líderes comunitarios y los que siguen viviendo la guerra. Como lo dicen los analistas del CINEP/PP un proceso duradero y legítimo tiene que ser regionalizado. 

El enfoco gubernamental sobre la prudencia (que los guerrilleros también han respetado) hace mucho sentido dado la caotíca naturaleza del Caguán. Se ha hablado en unos sectores de someter el acuerdo a una asamblea constituyente, o un referendo popular (que, por supuesta, podria ser derrotado por el uribismo). Sin embargo, daría mucha pena si la paz, como fue la paz coja del 58 que acabó con la ‘Violencia’ pero abrió el camino para las FARC, sería como la guerra en este país – impuesta por los poderesos sobre ‘la Otra Colombia’ sin consulta ni espacio para sus voces.

Uribe y su Puro Centro Demócratico dice que el no es opositor de la paz, pero que se opone a ‘paz con impunidad‘. La diversidad en la marcha hoy quizas muestra que la mayoría de los colombianos quieren poner sus diferencias al lado y tomar ventaja de esta rara oportunidad para un acuerdo viable con una guerrilla que hace pocos años se tildaba de ‘narcoterrorista’ y hace unas decadas se pensó invencible. Sin embargo, solo porqué los Uribistas no han salido a la calle no quiere decir que no tienen apoyo, y que todas las víctimas esten a favor del proceso.

La paz, como todo en este mundo, vendrá con su precio. Las FARC-EP han dicho reitaradamente que no irán a la carcel como parte de un acuerdo. Ellos se consideran las víctimas; quieren hacer política ahora con garantias y no le quieren dar la cara a sus víctimas, ni de que hablar de cumplir castigo por sus delitos.

Entonces, se puede decir, de alguna manera, que Alvaro Uribe si tiene razón. Indudablemente, va tener que ver un compromiso entre la “justicia” y la “paz”. Muchos en la izquierda, y con buena razón, fueron muy críticos hacia el proceso de desmovilización con las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). Sin embargo, parece muy estraño que el vocero que les esta reclamando a las FARC-EP las víctimas sea el ex-Presidente contra-insurgente y no esta dando esa misma crítica. De todos modos, se tiene que decir que ese compromiso entre la justicia y la paz es un tema muy delicado y controversial; dentro de los medios de comunicaciones corrientes, los políticos, y la mayoria de analistas que estan a favor del proceso hay un lenguaje de llamado al perdon y la reconciliación como si las víctimas se las deben al país, pero ese compromiso (cuanta ‘justicia’ en cambio a cuanta ‘paz’) no es algo que se podrá imponer desde La Habana, ni desde Bogotá. La paz del 58 fue una paz entre victimarios, poderosos, y que fue impuesta, dejando heridas abiertas que dejaron la tierra colombiana fertil para el derramo de sangre de la proxima media decada.

Finalmente, la guerra en Colombia en muchos sentidos si y no es contra las FARC-EP. Esta guerrilla sigue desplazando, matando, amenazando, reclutando, y cometiendo todo tipo de crímenes de guerra y de lesa humanidad, pero la violencia del neoparamilitarismo es mucho más de una amenaza a la seguridad pública que las guerrillas. Esto no quiere decir que la prioridad que se da al dolor humano de las personas que siguen siendo victimizados por las FARC-EP debe ser menor por el hecho que las bandas emergentes son mas violentas, pero si quiere decir que un acuerdo de paz con las FARC-EP (y hasta con el ELN) no acabará con la guerra y la violencia en Colombia de manera holística.

Incluso esta mañana el Presidente Santos en su Twitter reconoció la lastimosa muerte de Ever Antonio Cordero Oviedo, defensor de derechos humanos y restitución de tierras que fue recientemente asesinado en Valencia, Córdoba. Este señor es solo uno de los miles de Colombianos quienes estan siendo victimazados por esta nueva composición del paramilitarismo, y quienes, por el discurso del gobierno de que son simples ‘bandas criminales’ sin conexiones al poder regional y local, no estan recibiendo ninguna marcha hoy. Entre estos miles figuran por ejemplo, las mujeres de la Asociación  Desplazados Dos de Mayo (ADOM) en el Chocó, y las Mujeres del Valle Encantado en Córdoba.

En Colombia, el desarollo ecónomico de algunos sectores esta ligados a la guerra. La guerra es en Colombia, una especia de institución propia. Desarmar esa institución, cuyas raizes estan nexas a tantas otras instituciónes como el poder político, ecónomico, la industria militar, etc va tener un alto precio. La guerra es un negociazo, y para acabar con ella tendra que haber un cambio fundamental en la sociedad colombiana. El emperador del Etiopia, Haile Selassie, en un discurso que fue immortalizado en una canción de Bob Marley llamado guerra dice que “hasta que no haya ciudadanos de primera y de segunda clase de ninguna nación, habra guerra“.

Este proceso de paz entonces debe ser un proceso tranformativo para la sociedad colombiana. No solo de reconciliación entre víctimas, y víctimarios (dos identidades que se cruzan con frequencia), pero de un nuevo contrato social para empezar a deconstruir esa muralla que divide Las Dos Colombias. La paz contra las FARC-EP tiene que ser un proceso que no solo desata un proceso con el ELN, y el neoparamilitarismo, pero que también empieza una conversación mas amplia sobre las violencias estructurales como la pobreza, el machismo, el racismo, la desigualdad, y sobre todo el clasismo que podujieron las guerrillas.

Tendrá el país esa conversación? Hace 10 años hablar de una negociación con los ‘narcoterroristas’ era imposible, y ahora es algo apoyado generalmente. Tomó una decada de contrainsurgencia, desplazamiento, asesinato, parapolítica, y guerra total, pero por lo menos esto demuestra que los colombianos han podido cambiar de opinión, dejar de al lado el guerrerismo y el odio contra las guerrillas en favor de un supuesto bien común (una paz nacional). Pero ese cambio, como lo que vendrá, tuvo un precio.

PS

No todo lo ocurrido fue en Bogotá, les invito a conocer lo ocurrido con el Centro de Memoria Histórica en Buenaventura.

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